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The present paper deals with the establishment of a new methodology in order to evaluate the
inherently safer characteristics of a continuous intensified reactor in the case of an exothermic reaction.
The transposition of the propionic anhydride esterification by 2-butanol into a new prototype of ‘‘heat-
exchanger/reactor’’, called open plate reactor (OPR), designed by Alfa Laval Vicarb has been chosen as a
case study. Previous studies have shown that this exothermic reaction is relatively simple to carry out in
a homogeneous liquid phase, and a kinetic model is available. A dedicated software model is then used
not only to assess the feasibility of the reaction in the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ but also to estimate the
temperature and concentration profiles during synthesis and to determine optimal operating conditions
for safe control. Afterwards the reaction was performed in the reactor. Good agreement between
experimental results and the simulation validates the model to describe the behavior of the process
during standard runs.
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) was then applied to the intensified process in order to
identify the potential hazards and to provide a number of runaway scenarios. Three of them are
highlighted as the most dangerous: no utility flow, no reactant flows, both stop at the same time. The
behavior of the process is simulated following the stoppage of both the process and utility fluid. The
consequence on the evolution of temperature profiles is then estimated for a different hypothesis taking
into account the thermal inertia of the OPR. This approach reveals an intrinsically safer behavior of
the OPR.1. Introduction
Most of the processes involved in the specialty chemical
industries are batch or semi-batch. They are particularly con-
venient because of their flexibility and make it possible to produce
a large range of different chemicals within the same apparatus.
Indeed, fine chemicals industry is often confronted with the rapid
change of the customer’s demand and has to be able to switch
quickly from one reaction to another. Through time these reactors
were improved by numerous specific tools that were developed in
order not only to increase their efficiency, optimize yield and
selectivity (Zhang & Smith, 2004) but also to decrease the
environmental impact by reducing the use of solvent (Elgue, Prat,
Cabassud, & Ce´zerac, 2006). However, these kind of reactors: +33344556565.
enaı¨ssa),present an important technological limit: temperature control is
not always sufficient and numerous case histories have demon-
strated that most of the thermally initiated accidents took place in
batch processes (Gustin, 2002). When an exothermic reaction is
carried out, unpredicted deviations can lead to dangerous
situations: cooling failure as well as inappropriate stirring,
unknown side reactions and wrong reactant dosing could initiate
a runaway. From the 80s, safety has become a priority in the
design and development of chemical processes (Lees, 2001). Large
research effort contributed to the improvement of new safety
tools and methodologies: for instance several calorimetric devices
have been invented for the fast determination of thermo-kinetic
behavior of the reactions involved (Maria & Heinzle, 1998). But
also, systematic methods are now available to anticipate the
potential responses of batch processes in the case of thermal
deviations and to include appropriate external safety barriers in
the overall facility (Stoessel, 1993).
But nowadays, the chemical industry has to go further and deal
with new challenges. In addition to producing more and faster,
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Nomenclature
C concentration (mol L1)
Cpr heat capacity of the reaction mixture (J g
1 K1)
Ea activation energy (Jmol1)
Hr acidity function
k0 frequency factor
k reaction rate constant
m mass (kg)
mr reaction mixture mass (kg)
p kinetic parameters
R gas constant (J K1mol1)
r reaction rate (mol L1 s1)
Tr temperature of the reaction mixture (K)
T0 temperature of the reaction mixture before deviation
(K)
t time (s)
V volume (L)
X steady-state conversion reached during normal op-
eration
Greek
DHr heat of reaction (Jmol1)
DTad adiabatic temperature rise (1C)
F adiabatic coefficient
Subscript
2but 2-butanol
acp propionic acid
anhp propionic anhydride
cat1 catalyst 1
cat2 catalyst 2
k cell index
Abbreviation
ICI imperial chemical industries
MTSR maximum temperature of the synthesis reaction in
the cell number k (1C)
PC process chamber
TP transition plates
SP sandwich plates
TE thermal environment
UF utility fluidinherently safer and cleaner production must be performed.
Thus, alternatives have emerged to dramatically improve chemical
processes. Green chemistry is certainly one of the most relevant
examples. During the previous decades, new perspectives have
emerged with process intensification. This movement started a
new way of thinking concerning the evolution and the future
design of production units in the chemical industry: the challenge
is to decrease their size but increase their efficiency (Stankiewicz &
Moulinj, 2002). In this field, process intensification can be
considered as a method that allows one to prevent and reduce
risks related to major industrial accidents. To reach this objective,
one solution is to create new types of equipments with innovative
characteristics and significantly higher performances in order to
attain better heat transfer and thus safer conditions compared to
traditional batch or semi-batch operations. These performances can
be attained by modifying the operating conditions by employing
higher concentrations and using less solvent and reaction volumes.
Focusing on the reaction zone, some successful projects have
already demonstrated that it was possible to conceive original
reactors, miniaturized, multifunctional and/or continuous. For
instance, ICI improved dramatically one of their production plants
by combining the qualities of a heat exchanger and a chemical
reactor in the same apparatus (Phillips, Lausche, & Peerhossaini,
1997). These encouraging results illustrated how the chemistry
industry could move in new directions and how engineering
science could be used to replace traditional processes with new
promising reactors smaller, better and safer. Since the initial
applications, process intensification did not stop growing and
today we can find numerous studies on innovative pilots (Jachuk,
2002; Stankiewicz, 2003). New prototypes of ‘‘heat-exchanger/
reactors’’ are a good illustration: built like a plate heat-exchanger,
internal plates are designed in order to carry out chemical
synthesis. But because of these new concepts of reactor design
being less familiar than traditional ones, research work is necessary
not only to assess their feasibility and potentialities but also to
evaluate their efficiency and intrinsic characteristics.
The aim of this work is to evaluate the inherently safer
characteristics of an intensified continuous heat-exchanger/reactor. To meet this goal, a prototype of ‘‘heat-exchanger reactor’’,
provided by Alfa Laval Vicarb, called open plate reactor (OPR), was
considered to carry out the esterification of propionic anhydride
by 2-butanol. Firstly, the feasibility of the transposition of this
reaction into the OPR was experimentally validated (Benaissa,
2006). Later, risk assessment of the process was performed, which
highlights accidental scenarios. One major scenario is the
stoppage of both process and utility flows. Therefore, this work
focuses on the thermal consequences of flows failure considering
the physical characteristics of the different elements of the OPR.
Moreover, a comparison between the kinetics and the heat-
transfer characteristics times allows discriminating the different
hypothesis taken into account to estimate temperature variations
after failure.2. Case study: propionic anhydride esterification
Esterification of propionic anhydride by 2-butanol leads to
butyl propionate and propionic acid (Fig. 1). This synthesis was
first studied by Snee, Barcons, Hernandez, and Zaldivar (1992) in
order to elaborate a standard method for determining thermo-
dynamic parameters using numerous adiabatic and isothermal
calorimetric devices. The system has later been chosen in many
studies relating to the assessment of the chemical risk and
specifically to build optimal safety procedures for batch and semi-
batch reactors (Feliu, Iban, Alos, & Macias-Hernandez, 2003;
Ubrich, Srinivasan, Lerena, Bonvin, & Stoessel, 1999). This reaction
constitutes a relevant case study for the transposition from batch
to continuous process: it is relatively simple to carry out in a
homogeneous liquid phase, is exothermic, and a kinetic model is
available.
The synthesis is exothermic: Galvan, Zaldivar, Hernandez, and
Molga (1996) found a value of DHr ¼ 62.99 kJmol1 and Ubrich,
Srinivasan, Lerena, Bonvin, and Stoessel (2001) proposed
DHr ¼ 62.5 kJmol1. Both authors agree that there is no
decomposition reaction.
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Fig. 1. Reaction scheme for the esterification of propionic anhydride by 2-butanol.
Table 1
Kinetic parameters equations
Subscript i k0i Eai (Jmol
1) Parameter pi
1 5.36178107a 80,478.64 2.002101
2 2.80741010b 79,159.5 3.205102
3 3.94801010a 69,974.6 21.3754
4 1.4031108a 76,617.2 12706
a Lmol1 s1.
b L2mol2 s1.2.1. Kinetics model
According to Snee et al. (1992), the reaction rate is a function of
the catalyst: without the catalyst the reaction is second-order but
has a kind of autocatalytic behavior when sulfuric acid is present
in the reaction mixture.
When the reaction is performed with no strong acid as catalyst,
the reaction is slow and follows second-order kinetics, first order
in each reactant (Galvan et al., 1996):
r ¼ k0CanhpC2but (1)
with
k1 ¼ 5:36 107 exp 
80478
RTr
 
(2)
In the presence of sulfuric acid, Zaldivar, Hernandez, Molga,
Galvan, and Panetsos (1993) made the following remarks: The reaction rate seems to be proportional to the acid
concentration. The reaction rate increases with propionic acid concentration,
causing a kind of autocatalytic behavior (Eqs. (3) and (4)). After having reached a certain concentration, propionic acid no
longer influences the reaction rate.Since the various theoretical reaction pathways are complex, an
empirical model was devised assuming the existence of two
catalysts (cat1, cat2) (Dhanuka, Malshe, & Chandala, 1977). The
transformation of the initial catalyst was developed by taking into
account the acidity function (Eq. (5)).
Reaction 1: propionic anhydride+2-butanol-butyl propiona-
te+propionic acid.
Reaction 2: catalyst 1-catalyst 2.
The reaction rate of the main reaction can be written as
r1 ¼ ðk1 þ k2Ccat1 ÞCanhpC2but þ k3Ccat2Canhp (3)
The reaction rate due to the formation of the second catalyst is
also taken into account:
rcat ¼ k410HrCcat1C2but (4)
Lastly, the expression of the acidity function is
Hr ¼ ðp1Ccat1 þ p2CacpÞ p3 þ
p4
Tr
 
(5)
Reaction rate constants follow Arrhenius law:
ki ¼ k0i exp 
Eai
RTr
 
(6)
The kinetic parameters are summarized in Table 1.3. Heat-exchanger reactor OPR
3.1. Pilot plant description
The reaction unit used in the process was designed by Alfa
Laval Vicarb and built like a multi-plates heat exchanger divided
into three sections (Prat, Devatine, Cognet, Cabassud, & Gourdon,
2005) (Fig. 2). Each section is made up of a reaction plate where
the reaction mixture flows, surrounded by two cooling plates
containing the utility fluid. The reactants and catalyst are stored
separately and put in contact only at the entrance at the first
reaction plate. It appears particularly well-suited to process
intensification, as it is possible to attain better heat transfer since
the heat transfer surface/reaction volume ratio is increased and
the utility flow much higher than the process one: about
3000 Lh1 compared to the reactants flow-rate of 50 Lh1. Under
these conditions, previous studies have shown that the OPR can be
considered as a plug flow reactor. The total pilot capacity is 1.5 L of
reaction mixture (0.5 L per section). This new concept of ‘‘heat-
exchanger/reactor’’ has been chosen as a typical example of a
small continuous reactor. The successive plates of one block of the
reactor can be represented as shown in Fig. 3: inside the reactive
plate (RP), the environment of the reaction mixture is composed
of PolyetherEtherKetone (PEEK). The utility fluid (UF) flows
between two stainless steel plates: the sandwich plates (SP) and
the transition plates (TP).3.2. OPR modeling
A specific computer simulation program has been written in
parallel to the development of the reactor in order to predict the
‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ behavior according to the operating
conditions (Elgue et al., 2006). It integrates a precise description
of the OPR geometry and models the hydrodynamic reaction
phenomena as well as heat transfer in the device (Benaissa et al.,
2008). As the OPR is a continuous plug-flow reactor, process flow
modeling is based on the classical representation of a sequence of
perfectly stirred tank reactors (called cells) (Neuman, 2002). In
the case of a pilot plant composed of three blocks, experimental
distribution of residence times, which allows flow analysis,
showed that the reaction line could be described by a series of
91 cells which corresponds to the actual number of rows (Fig. 4).
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Fig. 2. View of the instrumented ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ OPR.
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Fig. 3. Successive plates contained in a block of the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ OPR.In this configuration, the state and the evolution of a cell solely
depend on the phenomena taking place inside (reaction and heat
transfer) and on the inlet streams, which are generally the outlet
streams of the previous cell (Fig. 5). In the simulation framework,
the model is then based on balance equations (mass and energy)
and on constraints equations for each cell. The software takes
into account the specific geometry of the intensified reactor
and provides the temperature profiles of the cooling fluid as
well as the temperature and conversion profiles along the reaction
line.
The use of this data-processing tool makes it possible to assess
the feasibility of carrying out the esterification in the OPR. The
main parameters to be modified are the initial sulfuric acid
concentration, inlet temperature and cooling fluid flow-rate. It is
then possible to determine the operating conditions in terms of
molar conversion while maintaining proper heat transfer and an
overall temperature lower than 100 1C in order to avoid the boiling
point of the reaction mixture (Benaissa, 2006). Preliminary
reaction tests carried out with the OPR have been used to validate
the simulation framework. Fig. 6 shows the results of an
experiment carried out with the following conditions: utility
temperature (70 1C), utility flow rate (3m3h1), process flow rate
(stoichiometric ratio) (50 Lh1) and sulfuric acid mass fraction
(0.8% expressed as a percentage of the weight of 2-butanol), after
the stationary state has been reached. The temperature profiles
obtained with the framework are compared with the data
obtained by the sensors placed along the reaction line and the
utility line of the pilot. This figure shows a good agreement
between the measurements carried out with the thermocouples
and the simulation. Thus, the complete model was validated andthe feasibility of the reaction case study carried out in the OPR
was demonstrated.4. Risk assessment: hazard and operability (HAZOP) method
In order to achieve a risk assessment on the overall unit
studied, the process flow diagram had to be first designed as
complete and as clear as possible. The schematic representation
used for this study, including all materials, is presented in Fig. 7.
Four main flow lines were designed: one for feeding each reactant
(reactant number 1 and number 2), one for products collection
and one for the utility fluid circulation. This utility fluid line is a
thermal closed loop filled by glycol water. The inlet temperature
(TR10) of this fluid is controlled via two heat exchangers
connected to two secondary circuits: one ensuring heating, the
other cooling.
Each raw material is stored in two different tanks. The feed
lines ensure reactant introduction in the reactor at a given tempe-
rature: the main line connected to the first storage tank
has a nominal operating point of 30 Lh1, whereas the secondary
line operates at 20 Lh1. 2-Butanol and sulfuric acid are mixed
with propionic anhydride after their introduction in the reactor.
The products are then collected at the outlet of the third block
and sent to another storage tank. Two other storage tanks
contain pure water in order to clean and purge the pipes before
and after the experiment. The utility line was designed to be
flexible: the ethylene glycol can be heated by a boiler or cooled
down by an external water circulation. The operating inlet
temperature is controlled at 70 1C. Parameters such as tempera-
ture, pressure and flow rate are measured along the fluid lines
with specific devices and nine thermocouples located in the
reactive plates.
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Fig. 4. Reaction line modeling by a series of 91 cells.
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Fig. 6. Process and utility fluid temperature profiles along the OPR: simulation and
experimental results.The HAZOP method was then carried out on this process flow
diagram in order to provide a full examination of the potential
hazards in the OPR system and help to identify numerous
scenarios when the standard operation fails.
An HAZOP team with expert knowledge of the process was
established, including a team leader, a safety representative, three
process engineers, two technicians and one simulation specialist.
The basis of HAZOP is a ‘‘guide word examination,’’ which is a
deliberate search for deviations from the design of the installation
(according to International Standard IEC 61882, 2001). To facilitate
the examination, the system was divided into seven parts: storage tanks containing water,
 storage tank containing reactant number 1 (propionic anhy-
dride),
 storage tank containing reactant number 2 (2-butanol and
sulfuric acid), propionic anhydride feeding line,
 2-butanol and sulfuric acid feeding line,
 ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ OPR,
 utility fluid closed loop.Each part contains the following elements: materials, activities,
sources and destinations. The HAZOP team examined each
element for deviations, which can lead to undesirable conse-
quences. The identification of deviations was achieved by the
questioning process using predetermined ‘‘guide words’’. The role
of the guide word is to stimulate imaginative thinking, to focus
the study and promote ideas and discussion, thereby maximizing
the chances of a maximum complete study. Basic guide words
used were, for instance: no, more, less, as well as, reverse, etc.
Using these standard key words successively on each part of
the process, and each principal parameter (flow, temperature,
pressure, initial composition), it was possible to define how
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Storage tank
WATER
E1
Ω
TR3
FR1
PR1
Storage tank
Reactant n°1
VM11VM12
P1
VP1
VM14
VM15VC1
VM16
Storage tank
WATER
Ω
TR4
FR2
Storage tank
Reactant n°2
VM17VM18
P2
VP2
VM19
VM20
VM21
VC2
PR2
Storage tank
Products
TR5
TR28
VM1VM6
TOR1
VRP1
TR29
TR29
VM9
TR10 PR3 FR3
VM10 VRP2
E2
TR11
VM7 P3
TR30
TR32
TR31 TOR2TOR3
VM8
VM12
Cold 
water
Boiler
Utility fluid 
closed loop
Fig. 7. Process and flow diagram of the pilot unit around the OPR.
Table 2
HAZOP data sheet sample
Guide
word
Deviation Causes Consequences Action required
None No utility
flow
(1) P3 pump fails (motor fault, electricity
breakdown).
(A) Loss of feed to utility section. (a) Install flow alarm on reactor feed.
(2) Line blockage, valve closed in error, clogging
heat exchangers E1, E2.
(B) No possibility of cooling the reaction
mixture in case of failure.
(b) Regular control of the equipments: water
tests.
None No reactant
flows
(3) P1/P2 pumps fails in the same time (motor
fault, electricity breakdown).
(C) No circulation of the reaction mixture in
the OPR.
(c) Install flow alarm on reactor feed.
(4) Line blockage, valve closed in error, clogging of
the reactive line.
(D) Adiabatic increase in temperature. (d) Safety valve in order to empty the reactive
line outside the reactor.undesirable events can occur. The conclusions of the meeting have
to be presented in a table, and to be as concise and clear as
possible (Freeman, Lee, & McNamara, 1992). Table 2 illustrates the
result data sheet, giving a short sample of the analysis carried out
on the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ OPR part.
Among all the potential hazards highlighted by the HAZOP
method, three scenarios were identified as the most dangerous
ones. These scenarios could potentially lead to a thermal
runaway: no utility flow, no reactant flows, both stop of the
utility and reactant line.
Although at the time of the analysis, it was not possible to identify
precisely what would be the consequences of these scenarios, withoutthis information, it was impossible to set up appropriate safety
measures and define the action required. The HAZOP results had then
to be completed with further study about the process line evolution
after failure to identify the dangerous issues.5. Process line evolution after flows failure
When both process and utility fluids stop, another modeling
has to be adopted, considering 91 closed cells independent from
each other. After this deviation, the evolution of the liquid phase
contained in a cell is determined only by the reaction inside it and
ARTICLE IN PRESSfrom transfer with its thermal environment, according to the
following hypotheses:Tab
Ma
mrC
F0
Fhomogeneity of characteristic values (temperature, composi-
tion, etc.), homogeneity of physical properties (density, viscosity, etc.),
 homogeneity of physico-chemical phenomena (reaction, trans-
fer, etc.),
 no variation of volume,
 no transfer between the cells.
What is then the final temperature profile reached inside the
process line in the case of flows failure? Since each cell is
considered as a stirred tank reactor, it is possible to calculate for
each cell k the parameters used to build the runaway scenario
diagram well-known in the field of chemical process safety
methodologies (Stoessel, 1993): the adiabatic temperature rise
(DTad) (Eq. (7)) and the maximum temperature of the synthesis
reaction (MTSR) (Eq. (8)):
DTkad ¼
DHrð1 XkÞ
mkrCp
k
r
(7)
MTSRk ¼ Tk0 þ DTkad (8)6. Thermal inertia of the OPR and adiabatic coefficient
The runaway scenario is usually set up for batch reactors in the
case of a cooling failure: the evolution of the reactor switches in
adiabatic mode. However, the OPR has one feature which makes it
very interesting from a safety point of view: it has an important
thermal inertia. The mass of the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ is
considerably greater than the reaction mixture, whereas it is the
opposite for batch reactor. Indeed, each cell is surrounded by its
own thermal environment made of different plates of the
structure (Fig. 8): The reaction plate (RP) where the reaction mixture flows. It is
built with PEEK, which is a plastic material able to resist very
high temperatures and most of the corrosive chemical
products.le 3
ss and heat capacity product and adiabatic coefficients of the process fluid containi
Process
Thermal environment
Reaction mixture Reaction plate (peek)
pr (J K
1) 29 8
1 1.28
1 1.28
Reactive
plate (RP) SPSP UF TPUFTP
Fig. 8. Structure of the reactor by a sequence of different plates.ng i
San
(sta
12
1.
1.Two stainless steel sandwich plates (SP) used to separate
process and utility fluids. The area containing the utility fluid (UF) (water–glycol).
 Two stainless steel transition plates (TP) (left and right), which
allow the thermal isolation of each block.
The first line of Table 3 gives the product of the mass by the
heat capacity for each element of the thermal environment at the
level of a cell. Compared with that of the reacting mass contained
in the cell, these values are not negligible. It means that in the
case of the OPR the mass of the reactor could play a role in the
dissipation of the energy released by the reaction. Another
parameter estimates the relative importance of the reactor
mass: the adiabatic coefficient defined as the ratio of specific
heats (Eq. (9)):
F ¼ 1þ SmTECpTE
mrCpr
(9)
In the second line of Table 3 the coefficient is calculated taking
each element separately (F0), and in the third line by adding the
different terms successively (F). In a batch reactor, the adiabatic
coefficient does not generally exceed 1.2. It is obvious that the
coefficient is more important in the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’,
which confirms that the thermal inertia is an important factor in
the study of the OPR.
According to these results, it is possible to consider that a part
of the energy released by the reaction would be dissipated in the
different parts of the reactor’s structure. In this way, the
calculation of the temperature rise has to take into account
the thermal inertia of the reactor. For this purpose, Eq. (7) has to
be changed as follows:
DTkad ¼
DHrð1 XkÞ
mkrCp
k
r
1
F
. (10)
Five scenarios have been studied:(1)n
d
4
6the adiabatic case (F0 ¼ 1),
(2) a part of the energy released is dissipated in the reaction plate
(F0 ¼ 1.28),
(3) a part of the energy released is dissipated in the sandwich
plates (F0 ¼ 1.41),
(4) a part of the energy released is dissipated at the same time in
the reaction plate and in the sandwich plates (F ¼ 1.69),
(5) the energy is dissipated in the entire mass of the reactor
(F ¼ 11.96).The reaction plates and sandwich plates are chosen because
they are directly in contact with the process fluid. Fig. 9 shows the
final temperature profiles along the reaction line reached after
deviation. The initial conditions are given by a simulation for the
following operating conditions: utility temperature (70 1C), utilityone cell and in its thermal environment
wich plates
inless steel)
Utility fluid (water
glycol)
Transition plates
(stainless steel)
44 254
1 2.51 9.76
9 3.2 11.96
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Fig. 9. Final temperature profiles reached by the reaction mixture along the OPR
after flows stoppage according to five hypotheses (1–5).
Table 4
Minimum characteristic times to reach MTSR after deviation
Minimum reaction time (s)
(1) Adiabatic 18
(2) Reaction plate 26
(3) Sandwich plates 29
(4) Reaction plates+sandwich plates 36
(5) Total mass 200
Table 5
Heat transfer characteristic times for each part of the reactor’s structure
Heat transfer time (s)
Reaction plate 12
Sandwich plates 0.03flow rate (3m3h1), process flow rate (stoichiometric ratio)
(50 Lh1) and sulfuric acid mass fraction (0.8%) (Fig. 6).
The adiabatic mode is the least favorable for the thermal
evolution of the reaction mixture; the relative curve provides
therefore a border for the maximum temperature which can be
reached by the process. We can also notice that the more high
the adiabatic coefficient is, which means that the more important
the mass taking part in the thermal dissipation is, the more the
temperature profile decreases, which is very interesting regarding
safety. However, this figure does not allow one to determine
which curve would be effectively reached by the process. For an
infinite time, we can assume that the energy would be dissipated
by the total mass, but, meanwhile, what curve would be reached?
Is it the adiabatic case or one of the other scenarios? To answer
this question two characteristic times are introduced: one relative
to the synthesis reaction and the other corresponding to the heat
transfer in the reactor mass.
7. Characteristic times
7.1. Synthesis reaction
The first characteristic time is related to the kinetic of the
synthesis and allows answering the question: how long does it
take to reach the final temperature profiles after deviation from
normal operation? This time can be obtained by the resolution of
mass and energy balances for each cell taking the normal
operation as the initial condition. The final condition is reached
when the reaction is complete. Moreover, the mass equation has
to be modified for each hypothesis as shown in Eq. (11). Table 4
gives the minimum time calculated for the 91 cells. For instance, it
takes at least 18 s to reach the adiabatic curve from the normal
operation one:
qTkr
qt
¼ r1V
kDHr
mkr Cp
k
r
1
F
(11)
7.2. Heat transfer inside the OPR
The second characteristic time is related to the heat transfer
inside the reactor mass and allows one to answer the question:
how long does it take to diffuse the energy in the different
elements of the structure? In fact, when both fluids stop thetransfer mode is primarily conductive, each part of the structure
behaving then like a resistance to the transfer. These resistances
are characterized using the Biot number and the principles of the
diffusion in solids (Peczalski & Laurent, 2001). Considering a solid
at an initial temperature immersed in a fluid at constant
temperature different from solid temperature, the characteristic
time is defined as the time needed for the solid to reach the fluid
temperature (Mac Cabe, Smith, & Harriott, 1993). This time is
dependant on the thickness of the solid and on its physico-
chemical properties. Table 5 gives the times calculated for the
reaction plate and the sandwich plates.
7.3. Choice of a scenario
The two characteristic times have to be compared. We can
observe that the heat-transfer times are considerably smaller
(case of sandwich plates) than the reaction times or of the same
order of magnitude (case of reaction plate). Therefore, we can
consider the fourth assumption as acceptable. That this mean that
in comparison with the adiabatic scenario, the maximum
temperature would decrease up to 60 1C (Fig. 9). Thus, the thermal
inertia of the ‘‘heat-exchanger/reactor’’ allows it to be intrinsically
safer.8. Conclusion
Among the different ways to intensify a process, the possibility
to move a chemical reaction from batch to plug-flow continuous
processing mode is one of the most promising. From a safety point
of view a lot of benefits are expected. Firstly, the smaller
inventories engaged in this type of reactor will lead to minimize
the consequences in case of hazard release. In addition, as
demonstrated in this paper, the characteristics of the apparatus
can also contribute to increase the safety aspect of the process.
In particular, this work was conducted to evaluate the behavior
in a degraded mode of a continuous multi-plates heat-exchanger
reactor when an exothermic reaction is carried out. The aim is to
develop a safety study methodology in order to appreciate the
inherently safer characteristics of this new concept of reactor.
First of all, a process risk assessment was performed with the
HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) method to highlight accidental
scenarios leading to runaway. The likely major scenario chosen
corresponds to the simultaneous stoppage of process and utility
flows. To evaluate the consequences of this scenario, five
assumptions concerning the thermal inertia of the apparatus are
ARTICLE IN PRESSconsidered, including the adiabatic case. Thus, a specific computer
simulation program is used to calculate, on the one hand, the final
temperature profiles reached by the reaction mixture along the
OPR after flow stoppage and, on the other hand, the minimum
characteristic times to reach the maximum temperature of the
synthesis reaction (MTSR) after deviation. These times are then
compared with the heat-transfer characteristic times in the
different parts of the pilot structure. It shows that part of the
energy released by the reaction would be dissipated at the same
time in the plates closer to the reaction mixture: the reaction plate
made of PEEK and sandwich plates made of stainless steel. The
consideration of these ‘‘masses’’ in the heat-transfer phenomenon
leads to a maximum temperature decrease reached after a failure
of between 20 and 60 1C. This approach reveals an intrinsically
safer behavior of this apparatus compared to batch reactors.Acknowledgments
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